Animal Liberators Are Not Anti-Science by Magel, Charles
Animal Liberators 










A critical analysis ofAnimal Liberotors:
 
Research and Morality by Susan Sperling
 




In 1974 the United States Department of Health, 
Education and Welfare issued a profound set of ethical 
guidelines for the protection of human subjects 
participating in experiments.1 These guidelines have 
become standard within the scientific community. 
Surely there is nothing anti-scientific in the application 
of these guidelines. The guidelines require an 
Institutional Review Board approve experiments on 
humans. The IRB shall determine whether these human 
subjects will be placed at risk, and if risk is involved 
make sure: 
1.	 the risks to the subject are so outweighed by the
 
sum of the benefit to the subjectand the importance
 
of the knowledge to be gained as to warrant a
 
decision to allow the subject to accept these risks;
 




3. legally effective informed consent will be obtained
 
by adequate and appropriate methods; and
 




Special provisions are established for "vulnerables": 
children, the mentally infrrm, the terminally ill, the 
comatose, etc. Parents or guardians or special advocates 
must give permission, after insuring that the subject's 
interests are well protected. 
Three philosophical principles2 undergird the 
guidelines: 
• the principle of respect 
• the principle of beneficence 
• the principle of justice 
The overall principle is: No human is to participate 
in an experiment unless there is assurance the subject 
of the experiment will not be harmed-physically, 
psychologically. or socially, and unless the subject gives 
informed consent. The scientific community has 
accepted this principle. The application of these 
guidelines is in no way anti-scientific. Scientists do 
not regard the protection of human subjects in 
experiments to be inconsistent with academic freedom. 
Susan Sperling'sAnimal Liberators characterizes the 
modem animal rights movement, and animal rights 
activists, as being anti-scientific, fearful of science. 
I have been an animalliberator-an animal rights 
activist-for 12 years. Naturally I am interested in some 
perspective from cultural anthropology, Dr. Sperling's 
academic discipline. In her book, Sperling mentions 
the Animal Liberation from Laboratories demonstration 
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in Los Angeles in 1980. I was on the speakers' platfonn 
at that demonstration. Sperling discusses the 1983 
demonstrations at three major Primate Research Centers 
organized by Mobilization for Animals. I was on the 
speakers' platform at the Primate Research Center at 
the University of Wisconsin. Sperling discusses 
maternal separation experiments on Iangur monkeys. 
At the University of Wisconsin I was in public debate 
with psychologist Professor Steven Suomi, who worked 
with, and co-published with, Harry Harlow on maternal 
deprivation experiments on rhesus macaque monkeys. 
I have debated with scientists at the University of 
Minnesota and North Dakota State University. I spoke 
at a demonstration at the University of California San 
Diego Medical School. I served several years on the 
board of directors of the International Society for 
Animal Rights. I taught an Animal Rights course at 
Moorhead State University in Minnesota eight years. 
Each time, my class was visited by the Chair of the 
Biology Department, by the Chair of the Psychology 
Department, and by a representative of the Minnesota 
Farm Bureau. 
I have a deep respect for science. In graduate studies 
at the University of Minnesota I studied philosophy of 
science with philosophers of international reputation. 
I have taught philosophy of science. My life style is 
based on an attempt to get off the backs of animals to 
the greatest extent possible. So naturally, I looked 
forward to learning how a cultural anthropologist would 
view us animal rights activists. 
Let me list some characteri7.ations of us activists, 
and of the animal rights movement, as viewed by 
Sperling. Sperling uses the terms "animal liberators" 
and "animal rights activists" interchangeably. Sperling 
says, in effect 
I.	 Your animal rights movement is similar to a
 
charismatic cult (pp. 19, 194);
 
2.	 The concept of the millenium (suggestive of
 
millenarian sects and cults in Medieval times) is
 
an important theme in your animal rights ideology
 
(pp. 17, 194, 196-8). (Sperling always uses the
 
term "ideology" in referring to thought-patterns
 
in the animal rights movement. She does not
 
define "ideology." One meaning of"ideology" has
 
the connotation of intentional propagandizing or
 
distortion of facts. She never uses the term
 
"ideology" when discussing the thought-patterns
 
of the lobby groups promoting animal experimen-
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tation-for ex.ample, the California Biomedical 
Research Association (pp. 18, 19). In that context 
Sperling uses the tenns "hyperrational values" and 
"hyperrational empiricism" (p. 196). It would be 
helpful to have a definition of "hyperrational 
values," or at least some examples.) 
3. You animal rights activists think that the use of 
animals by science must be ended so that human 
harmony with nature can once again be restored 
(p. 196); 
4.	 Many of you animal liberators fear an ecological 
apocalypse, unless animal experiments are stopped 
by scientists (p. 99); 
5. You animal rights activists perceive scientists to 
be morally corrupt, greedy, and cruel (p' 20); 
6. You animal liberators contend that the cessation 
of animal experimentation is of paramount 
importance in solving the nuclear crisis (p. 83); 
7. Most of you animal rights activists are female, 
typically in your thirties; but the age range is broad 
enough to include "a fair number of gray heads" 
(p.85); 
8. You animal liberators regard science as dangerous 
(p.95); 
9.	 You animal rights activists view science as an agent 
of the destruction of nature. You view scientists 
and technicians as the institutional representatives 
of a materialistic society which seeks total 
domination over the world of nature (p. 97); 
10. You animal liberators think the profit motive is the 
ultimate cause of animal experimentation (p' 97); 
II.	 You animal rights activists regard biomedicine as 
dangerous and uncaring (p. 98); 
12. You animal liberators believe the redemption of 
society literally depends on the abolition of the use 
of animals in science (p. 194); 
13. As is typical	 of charismatic cults, many of you 
animal rights activists are alienated from modern 
scientific culture, and feel powerless and 
disenfranchised (p. 195); 
14. Unlike the Medieval millenarian charismatic cults 
which had charismatic prophets, you animal rights 
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activists do not have a prophet. Each one of you 
serves as your own prophet (pp. 196, 198); 
15.	 You animal rights activists tend to regard scientists 
as "left brainers," exemplifying the linear and 
"cold" intellectuality ofscience. You cultists prefer 
"right brainers," exemplifying intuitive, emotional, 
"warm" qualities (p. 136); 
16.	 Those of you animal liberators who are radical 
feminists are alanned by the connection between 
the male domination of women (especially in 
Western medicine) and the harmful experiments 
on innocent animals by patriarchal scientists (pp. 
141, 143, 148); 
17.	 Many of you animal rights activists are holistic 
health adherents, fearful of scientific incursions 
disturbing the healthy, harmonious fit of your 
bodies into the harmonious order of nature. You 
think organ transplants from animals disrupt this 
natural harmony (p. 153). You view the production 
ofdrugs, medicines, and chemical additives in your 
food, as technological pollution ofboth yourbodies 
and of nature (p. 202); 
18.	 Many ofyou animal liberators, on your frrst reading 
of Peter Singer's Animal Liberation, experience 
something like a revelation, a conversion, changing 
your whole life (p. 150); 
19.	 Many of you animal rights activists are converted 
to philosophies ofpersonal revelation--to "popular 
mystical, transcendental, Eastern Philosophies," 
like Buddhism, for example. You tend to feel that 
humans and animals and plants and the entire earth 
are one mystical being. And you are terrified by 
the technological incursions ofmodem science (pp. 
150,151); 
20. There is some resemblance between the horror 
you animal liberators experience when scientists 
experiment on animals, and the horror of witch­
craft when corrupt witches attack innocent victims. 
This nightmarish resemblance between animal 
experimentation and witchcraft may partly 
explain why many ofyou animal liberators cannot 
sleep properly, and even some of you are suicidal 
(pp. 154-5). 
So now I have the cultural anthropological 
perspective on whatI have been doing the past 12 years. 
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I must admit that Dr. Sperling's analysis has put me 
into a state of shock. I'm surprised Moorhead State 
University did not fire me the day I joined the animal 
rights movement 
What are we to make of this nonsense? I suggest 
that the import of this nonsense can be condensed into 
one sentence: You animal liberators are an irrational, 
emotional, alienated cult offanatical zealots woo are 
overwhelmed by rational science and modern 
technological society. 
IfSperling should tire of teaching I know where she 
could immediately quadruple her income. The 
American Medical Association3 is launching a multi­
million dollar public relations project, two main goals 
of which are: 




• To isolate the animal rights group from the 
general public. 
The A.M.A. would be delighted with Sperling's 
characterization of us: anti-science culL 
Let me try to formulate the basic argument 
structuring Sperling's view. Apparently, cultural 
anthropology finds it important to study the symbolic. 
roles of animals. Given that other sciences such as 
zoology, biology, ethology and psychology study the 
nature of animals, in and of themselves, it seems to be 
a fruitful study for anthropologists to study the human 
use of animals as representations of something else. 
This symbolic role of animals is prominent in what I 
take to be Sperling's basic argument: 
Interpretation ofSperling's Argu1tU!nt 
1.	 For you anima. liberators, animals are a symbol 
for nature. 
(Page 15: "Recently, animals have assumed a crucial 
symbolic role for many as representatives of a 
natural world....'') 
2.	 For you animal liberators, experiments on 
animals are a symbol for the scientilic, techno­
logical manipulation and corruption of nature. 
(page 155: Animal experimentation "is ... a perfect 
symbol for the modern dominance of technology 
over life.") 
3.	 You animal liberators experience anxiety from 
the threat or, or actual, teclmological manipu-
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lation and corruption or nature. 
(Page 28: "It is the linking of commonly felt 
anxieties and beliefs to the abuse of laboratory 
animals which gives the movement its distinctive 
and radical quality....'') 
4.	 Therefore, when you animal liberators protest 
animal experiments, you are not reaUy protesting 
the harming 0/ the animals. You are really 
protesting the anxiety caused in yourselves by 
the scientific, technological disruption ofnature. 
(page 132: "The roots of opposition to research 
with animals go far deeper than heightened humane 
responses to animal suffering.") 
(page 20: "... protest against research with animals 
.. .is directed to concerns beyond the pain and 
suffering of animals.") 
None of the statements in this argument reflect the 
essential nature of the animal rights movement. This 
analysis is wrong-headed. Why so? I will provide seven 
criticisms of Sperling's analysis, the frrst six mainly 
methodological, and the seventh-the most important­
more philosophical. 
1.	 First, Sperling distorts the analysis by claiming that 
the animal rights movement has focused protest 
specifically on the use ofanimals by science, rather 
than on the general issue of humane treatment of 
animals in all contexts. "... The signal concern of 
the modern movement is experimentation" (p. 77). 
This is not true. A much larger percentage of Peter 
Singer's Animal Liberation4 (a book which Sperling 
acknowledges to be the "bible" of the movement) is 
on the topic of animals used for food, and 
vegetarianism, than on animal experimentation. The 
animal rights movement is protesting the harming 
ofanimals in all contexts. Henry Spira ofNew York, 
probably the best known and most effective animal 
rights activist in this country, has recently said: "We 
see the problem of farm animals as a top priority 
because 95% of all animal suffering in the U.S. is in 
factory farming."s By tagging animal experimen­
tation as the central focus of the animal rights 
movement, Sperling distorts the nature of the 
movement. 
2.	 Second, Sperling claims that an analysis of the 19th 
century British anti-vivisection movement is very 
helpful in understanding the modern movement. She 
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is	 mistaken in this claim. The Victorian anti­
vivisection movement had no intellectual 
foundation. Not a single British philosopher had 
any interest in the movement. Not a single 
sophisticated scientist participated in the movement. 
I spent one week in the British Museum Library 
analyzing the complete testimony presented before 
the 1876 Royal Commission on Vivisection.6 Imade 
an analysis of the backgrounds of those who gave 
testimony. There were 49 representing science and 
medicine (including a very reluctant Charles 
Darwin). There were four on the anti-vivisection 
side, the main witness a courageous railroad 
engineer. The conflict between the scientific 
community and the Victorian anti-vivisectionists 
developed into a shouting match. The scientists were 
called "cruel monsters" and "murderers" and 
"torturers"; the anti-vivisectionists were called "anti­
science," "fearing science," "ignorant of science," 
"irrational," "sentimental." The rhetoric on both sides 
was not impressive. Sperling's projection ofVictorian 
anti-vivisectionist attitudes toward science on to 
the modern animal rights movement results in a 
major distortion. The fact that Victorian anti­
vivisectionists paid little attention to vegetarianism 
should have alerted Sperling to fundamental 
differences between the two movements. 
3.	 Third, Sperling's selection ofanimal rights literature 
is highly dubious. Her principal written sources for 
an analysis of the movement are flyers and 
pamphlets handed out at demonstrations against 
animal experiments, almost entirely, it appears, in 
the San Francisco Bay area. She finds 26 of these 
items to be "the richest source of written material 
on the developing ideology of the new groups" (p. 
97). In my recent Keyguide to Information Sources 
in Animal Rights7 I annotated 335 important works 
in the literature of the international animal rights 
movement. I should think these works would be a 
richer source than flyers and pamphlets. I provided 
information on 181 animal rights and animal welfare 
organizations, international and national. To restrict 
oneself to the ephemeral literature handed out by 
thirteen activist groups, most of them local, is 
inappropriate. 
4. Fourth, Sperling's interviews with nine local animal 
rights activists do not significantly support her 
analysis of the movement. Sperling thinks it 
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significant that most of these activists were also
 
active in other movements, such as radical feminism,
 
the ecological movement, holistic health, etc.; and
 
she thinks this variety of simultaneous movement
 
membership supports her thesis that the animal
 
rightists are not protesting the harming of animals
 
but are really protesting something else-the
 
disruption of nature by modem technological
 
science. I find a careful reading of the portions of
 
the interviews quoted support more plausibly the
 
view that the animal rights movement is essentially
 
concerned with the harming of animals. And that
 
the ecology movement is essentially concerned with
 
the harming of both humans and animals through
 
environmental damage. And that the feminists are
 
essentially concerned with the harming of women
 
as well as with the harming ofanimals. It should be
 
no surprise that these movements interconnect It is
 
exactly what one would expect.
 
5. Fifth, it is surprising that Sperling, a scientist, does 
not pay more attention to the activities of scientists 
and scientific organizations within the movement 
The enormously influential book Victims of 
Science,S published in England in 1975, was by 
Richard Ryder. Ryder did animal research at 
Columbia University, has a degree in experimental 
psychology from Cambridge University, and has a 
diploma in clinical psychology from Edinburgh 
University. Donald Barnes, director of the 
Washington, D.C. branch of the National Anti­
Vivisection Society9, is a psychologist who spent 
15 years at the U. S. Air Force School ofAerospace 
Medicine, irradiating over 1,000 monkeys and 
baboons. Barnes changed his mind, breaking out 
ofwhat he calls "conditioned ethical blindness," and 
became an activist. Sperling fails to consider three 
national scientific organizations in the United 
States: 
•	 Psychologists for the Ethical Treatment of 
Animals lO with a board of directors including 
ten scientists with Ph.D.s. The executive director 
is Professor Kenneth Shapiro, Psychology 
Department, Bates College, Maine. The organi­
zation publishes important position papers and 
other material. 
•	 The Association of Veterinarians for Animal 
Rightsll was founded in 1981 by Neil C. Wolff, 
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DVM, and Nedim C. Buyukmihci, VMD. 
Buyukmihci is a professor of opthalmology at 
University of California Davis, School of 
Veterinary Medicine. This organization has 
issued important position statements on twenty­
one animal rights topics. 
•	 Physicians Committee for Responsible 
Medicine.12 This is a nation-wide group of 
physicians which supports students' rights to do 
no harm to animals. It has published important 
materials on alternatives to the use of animals 
in medical education. The chainnan is Neal 
Barnard, M.D. from George Washington 
University School of Medicine, and a professor 
of psychiatry at that university. 
It is unfortunate that Sperling relied heavily on flyers 
handed out at demonstrations, and paid little 
attention to these scientific organizations. 
6. Sixth, it is astonishing that a book: published in 1988 
be so outdated. There is very little consideration of 
animal rights literature beyond 1984. In my 
research for the Keyguide to Information Sources 
in Animal Rights I soon realized we are in a virtual 
explosion ofanimal rights literature. I am convinced 
that more has been written on animals and ethics 
during the past 15 years than during all previous 
history. Approximately a third of the annotated 
works in my Keyguide were published after 1984. 
7.	 My last and most important criticism is that Sperling 
ignores the essential nature of the animal rights 
movement. In her analysis, animals are symbols of 
something else; animal experiments are a symbol 
of something else. Very much to the contrarY, the 
animal rights movement is concerned about the 
animals themselves-not about animals as symbols 
of something else. The movement is concerned 
about the harming ofanimals, not about the hanning 
ofanimals as the symbol of something else. Let me 
give you the flavor of the major themes recurrent in 
the animal rights literature. It is not my intent to 
persuade: it is my objective to provide a framework 
by which you can appreciate the revolutionary nature 
of the animal rights position or positions. At the 
theoretical level there are some disagreements 
among animal rights philosophers. But amazingly, 
at the practical level, there is close agreement on 
how we ought to treat animals. 
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I will consider six major themes in the animal 
rights literature: 
1.	 We humans are harming the animals. 
By the word "we" in this sentence, I mean we as a 
society, a society which institutionalizes the harming 
of animals. For example, although you and I are not 
now harmfully experimenting on an animal, we 
nevertheless are participating in animal experimentation 
by financing experiments through payment of taxes. 
Likewise, we are participating in the use of intensive 
factory farms in the raising of animals and poultry for 
food; we pay taxes to support land-grant universities 
which develop factory farming techniques. 
Animal rightists are concerned about all types of 
harm to animals: in trapping, in hunting, in zoos, in 
animal experiments and testing, in rodeos, in circuses, 
in films, in raising and slaughtering animals for 
food, etc. 
Peter Singer, in Animal Liberation, provides a 
detailed factual account of the various ways animals 
are harmed in animal laboratories and experiments and 
testing. Likewise, he gives an extensive factual 
description of how animals are harmed in intensive 
factory farming methods. Most readers of Animal 
Liberation are shocked to learn what is happening to 
animals. Sperling finds that readers ofSinger's Animal 
Liberation experience something like a revelation. 
Sperling to the contrary, this is not something like a 
religious-cultish revelation; it is a/actual revelation. My 
students in animal rights classes were stunned to learn 
what is happening to animals. 
There are many ways in which we can harm animals: 
la.	 To destroy the natural habitat of an
 
animal is to harm that animal.
 
Obviously, the very existence of an animal
 
depends on its environment. This type of
 
harm reveals the intimate connection
 
between the animal rights movement and
 
environmental and ecological movements.
 
lb.	 To remove an animal from its natural
 
habitat is to harm that animal.
 
Removal from natural habitat results in
 
extreme distress and terror, also in the
 
disruption of psychological and social
 
relations with other members of the species.
 
Ie.	 To eause pain or distress or suffering or
 
misery or terror in an animal, unless to
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benefit that animal, is to harm that 
animal. 
As for humans, there are situations where 
suffering is necessary for ultimate benefit. 
If I terrify a deer with a firecracker to scare 
it out of the hunter's range, the terror in 
this sense leads to the benefit of the deer. 
Id.	 To mutilate an animal, unless to benefit 
that animal, is to harm the animal. 
It is rather obvious that the removal of an 
animal's leg is not normally in that animal's 
interest. But if the leg is gangrenous, 
amputation may well benefit it. 
Ie.	 To kill an animal, unless to benefit that 
animal, is to harm the animal. 
Some people seem to believe that if an 
animal be instantaneously killed, without 
any suffering, without any apprehension of 
being killed, the animal is not hanned. We 
surely do not think this when humans are 
killed instantaneously without suffering. 
Animal rightists regard killing as the 
ultimate harm, since it makes life 
impossible. There are cases where killing 
an animal is for its benefit; for example, 
when a deer is so severely mutilated when 
struck by a truck that it benefits the animal 
to be put out of its misery. 
2.	 The harming of an animal needs moral 
justification. 
We certainly believe that the harming of a human 
requires moral justification. Likewise, the harming of 
an animal needs moral justification. 
3.	 The burden of providing a moral justification is 
on the person who harms an animal. 
It is not the responsibility of the animal rightist to 
demonstrate that the harming of an animal is wrong. It 
is the responsibility of the harmer to demonstrate that 
the harming of an animal is not wrong. 
Since Sperling analyzed the animal rights movement 
in tenns of animal experimentation, let us take a look 
at typical attempts to justify harmful experiments on 
animals. Let me create a dialogue between the animal 
experimenter and the animal rightist 
Animal Experimenter: "Harmful experiments on 
animals are justified because God said it's O.K." 
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Animal Rightist: "First, you will have to prove the 
existence of God, which is impossible. When and 
where did God say anything about animal 
experimentation? It is surprising that rational, 
empiricistic, objective scientists should tum to 
theology to try to justify their experiments." 
(Note: Perhaps you think my dialogue is 
exaggerated. In 1986, in an essay in the ANlQls of 
the New York Academy of Science13, psychology 
professor Neal Miller of Rockefeller University 
used the biblical situation of Abraham being told 
by God to spare Isaac and sacrifice a ram instead 
to try to show that animal suffering is to be chosen 
over human suffering. I trust Neal Miller is a better 
pyschologist than theologian. That certainly is not 
the point of the Abraham-Isaac episode.) 
Animal Experimenter: "Harmful animal experiments 
are justified because society permits us to do it." 
Animal Rightist: "00 you believe human slavery was 
justifiedbecause American colonial society permitted 
it? Do you believe the extermination of Jews at 
Dachau was justified because Nazi society 
permitted it?" (Note: Perhaps you think my 
dialogue is exaggerated. I debated with psychology 
professorSteven Suomi at the University ofWisconsin 
on his maternal deprivation experiments on monkeys. 
His only ethical justification was: society permits it) 
Animal Experimenter: "Harmful animal experiments 
are justified because we humans are rational and 
animals are not rational." 
Animal Rightist: "Some animals are more rational than 
some humans. Chimpanzees are more rational than 
newly born human infants, and more rational than 
some severely retarded humans. Using this 
justification, you should experiment on some 
humans before experimenting on some animals. 1be 
use of rationality as a criterion is arbitrary. This 
kind of reasoning will lead you to the conclusion 
that it is much less objectionable to club a dull janitor 
than to club a smart college professor." 
Animal Experimenter: "Harmful animal experimen­
tation is justified because such experiments will give 
us knowledge about humans, which we can use to 
benefit us humans." 
Animal Rightist: You can only obtain knowledge about 
humans in animal experimentation because of 
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similarity between animals and humans. But surely 
humans are much more similar to humans, than they 
are to animals. So this is a still better reason for 
experiments on humans." (Note: R. G. Frey, a 
philosophy professor at Bowling Green State 
University who does not support moral rights for 
animals nevertheless concludes that we cannot 
justify harmful animal experiments on the basis 
of benefits without also justifying harmful 
experiments on humans. He concludes: ''The case 
for antivivisectionism ... is far stronger than most 
people allow."14) 
Animal Experimenter: "Harmful animal experimen­
tation is justified because it will give us knowledge, 
and any kind of knowledge is good in and of itself, 
whether it helps humans or not." 
Animal Rightist: "By that reasoning you must also 
conclude that experimenting on humans will give 
us knowledge, whether it helps humans or not." 
The animal rights literature is rich in critical analyses 
of claimed justifications for harming animals-in all 
contexts, not only in animal experimentation. Animal 
rightists have come to the conclusion that no attempted 
justification will prove satisfactory and that we should 
radically change our views on, and treatment of, animals. 
4. We have a duty not to harm the animals. 
Let's take a brief look at how Peter Singer would 
interpret this claim. Peter Singer's theoretical 
framework is utilitarianism. According to utilitarianism 
the goal ofall our actions and social policies should be 
to maximize the totality ofpleasure-and-happiness and 
to minimize the totality of pain-and-suffering. Singer 
argues that equal pains and equal pleasures should be 
given equal consideration, regardless of species 
membership. Agiven quantity of pain or suffering in a 
horse should receive equal consideration, morally, as 
the same quantity of pain or suffering in George Bush. 
This is what Singer means when he refers to the moral 
equality of humans and animals. Anyone who denies 
the moral equality of humans and animals in this sense 
is regarded as a speciesist, analogous to sexism and 
racism. Apparently Singer would characterize Dr. 
Sperling as a speciesist. In the preface to her book she 
states "An education in evolution has left me with a 
strong conviction of human uniqueness, and I cannot 
view animals as moral equals." (p. xi) Sperling seems 
to be arguing that animals are not morally equal to 
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humans because humans are unique. This is a very 
weak argument. One could just as welI argue that 
humans are not morally equal to rats because rats are 
unique. Perhaps I do not understand what a species is. 
I am under the impression that an species are unique. 
In his AnimalLiberation Peter Singer argues that the 
totality ofpain-and-suffering would be minimized, and 
the totality of pleasure-and-happiness would be 
maximized, by folIowing a social policy of phasing 
out harmful animal experimentation and phasing out 
the use of animals for food. 
Not alI philosophers are in complete agreement 
with Peter Singer's theoretical framework. IfI correctly 
understand Steve Sapontzis' theory, he argues for our 
duty not to harm animals on a somewhat expanded 
basis. I5 His basic approach is that animal liberation 
can be based on three fundamental principles already 
well accepted in our moral tradition: 
o	 We should be fair. 
o	 We should minimize suffering and maximize 
happiness. 
o	 We should develop moral character. 
The application of these three principles will result in a 
close approximation to vegetarianism, with the 
conclusion that experiments on animals should be 
governed by the same moral principles which govern 
human experiments. 
5. The animals have a right not to be harmed by us. 
Some philosophers use rights language and argue 
that a rights view is stilI stronger than a duty view as 
expressed in (4) above. Tom Regan, North Carolina 
State University, is the most prominent theorist 
arguing for anima1 rights in a technical sense.I6 Using 
principles of justice and equality, Regan develops a 
theory of moral rights for humans and animals, based 
on the equal inherent value of individuals which have 
experiences, individuals which are subjects of a life, 
individuals whose lives can become better or worse for 
them. Regan emphasizes the right not to be harmed, 
arguing the infliction of death to be the ultimate harm. 
Regan concludes: vegetarianism is morally obligatory; 
hunting and trapping are morally wrong; and harmful 
experiments and tests on animals should cease. 
6. Therefore, we should stop harming animals. 
This final conclusion reveals the revolutionary 
nature of the animal rights movement. This is not an 
absolute claim; it is a prima facie obligation which 
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holds except in extraordinary situations. The prima 
facie principle we should not harm humans generally 
applies; but the right of self-defense may justify 
exceptions. Similarly, our obligation not to harm 
animals may sometimes be weaker than our right to 
defend ourselves against threatened or actual harm by 
animals. Sperling, in herAnimal Liberators, ignores the 
revolutionary nature of the animal rights movement. 
Traditionally, animals have been regarded as resources 
to serve human interests. This tradition has one 
imperative: when harming animals to serve human 
interests do not cause U1UIecessary harm. That is, do 
not cause the animal any more harm than is required to 
serve the human interest. On the contrary, the animal 
rights movement sttesses the revolutionary imperative: 
Do not harm animals. Period. Animals are not 
resources for human manipulation. The same basic 
moral principles apply to humans and animals. 
Experiments on animals should be governed by the 
same ethical guidelines as those applying to 
experiments on humans. The same Institutional Review 
Board should be the approving agency for both human 
experiments and animal experiments. Risks (physical, 
psychological and social) to the animal should be 
carefulIy analyzed. The interests and the well being of 
the animal should be protected. Informed consent 
should be obtained. Three underlying ethical principles 
should be folIowed: the respect principle, the 
beneficence principle, and the justice principle. 
Someone may object: "But animals cannot give 
infonned consent!" What foIlows from this objection? 
The conclusion that we can therefore experiment on 
animals? From the fact that human infants cannot give 
infonned consent it does not follow that we are free to 
experiment on them. Animals have some ability to 
express their willingness or unwillingness to participate 
in experimentsP Their body language is communi­
cative. They can "vote with their feet." To the extent 
that animals cannot express consent or dissent, 
guardians or special advocates should be appointed to 
protect the animals' interests. Animals should be 
classified as "vulnerables," as are human infants and 
the severely retarded. 
Animal rightists are not anti-science. Animal 
rightists are against harming animals in all contexts. 
The application of ethical guidelines to animal 
experiments is no more anti-science than the 
application of the same guidelines to human 
experiments. 
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